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Abstract: Following centuries of Cartesianism, which ascribed conscious awareness to 
humans alone, philosophers have begun to explore the possibility that experience in 
some form is widely distributed in the universe.  It has been proposed that 
consciousness may pertain to machines, rocks, elementary particles, and perhaps the 
universe itself. This paper shows why philosophers have good reason to suppose that 
experiences are widely distributed in living nature, including worms and insects, but 
why panpsychism extending to non-living nature is an implausible doctrine.   
 
 
The view that nonhuman animals lack experiences was current in the middle of the 
last century, but the scientific consensus has since altered dramatically, returning to 
much earlier assumptions regarding the extent of consciousness in nature. That 
mammals and birds and perhaps even cephalopods and insects are aware--in a sense 
yet to be clarified-- of an external world is increasingly accepted by ethologists.
1
   
Some philosophers have pushed this trend further to the extent of arguing for 
some form of phenomenological awareness in non-living entities, including 
elementary particles and perhaps even the entire universe itself.  In 1996, David 
Chalmers maintained that a thermostat might be conscious and that consciousness 
might even be associated in some way with a rock.  "Some may worry," he 
commented, "about the fact that a thermostat is not alive, but it is hard to see why that 
should make a principled difference."
2
  More recently, Chalmers has voiced a 
preference for idealism over panpsychism,
3
 but panpsychism is alive and well in 
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2018, with active debate amongst adherents over whether tables, chairs, rocks, 
electrons might be conscious.
4
 
5
 
            I argue here that consciousness is a feature of certain mobile, self-propelled, 
self-protective biological individualsÑthat is to say, a feature of animals. There is a 
principled difference between animals, which are products of natural selection, and 
other kinds of entities.   Although synthetic animals with consciousness may someday 
exist, we probably don't have any yet, and neither a thermostat nor an electron will 
qualify as one.  Meanwhile, the more we learn about the competencies of animals 
belonging to other taxa, including social insects, the more compelling it becomes to 
restrict consciousness to living entities.   
  In what follows, I will first sketch the metaphysical and epistemological 
background to the emergence of the "new" panpsychism, next discuss the results of 
experimental and ethological approaches to understanding consciousness, and finally 
explore and defend the position that we should understand consciousness as an 
adaptation for addressing the problems of living.  This position blocks the inference to 
the very possibility of consciousness in most (though not all) non-living entities.      
 
I 
 In the next to last chapter of The Conscious Mind, which I will take as a 
founding text of the new panpsychism, along with Galen Strawson's 'Realistic 
Monism,' Chalmers considered the question where, on the scale from fish, whose 
phenomenal awareness of a world he thinks is not in doubt, to slugs, to neural 
networks, to thermostats "consciousness should wink out." Consciousness for 
thermostats is, he suggested there, "one reasonable way for things to go, and on 
reflection perhaps as natural a way as any."
 6
  The thermostat, he said, will not be 
intelligent, it will not think, it will not have psychological properties like learning and 
wanting, but what he called "phenomenal consciousness" is something else, and the 
thermostat may have that.   
 Having phenomenal consciousness--sometimes referred to as having qualia--
means simply having "experiences."  We humans perceive identifiable objects such as 
tables, chairs, and cups of coffee, with their shapes and colours, scents and sounds, 
their movements and felt surfaces and textures.  We see and sometimes recognize 
other people and animals. We experience "inner" sensations such as pain, itches, 
hunger, and fear, and we observe events involving people and things unfolding in a 
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world "outside" our bodies.  If other entities have phenomenal consciousness, they 
must have something "like' what we have, though it is of course impossible to know 
exactly "what it is like" to be them.
7
  "Someone who finds it crazy," Chalmers stated, 
"to suppose that a thermostat might have experiences at least owes us an account, of 
just why it is crazy." 
8
 Indeed, he went on to say, if there is experience in thermostats, 
 
there is probably experience everywhere, wherever there is a causal interaction there is 
information and wherever there is information (in for example the expanding and 
contracting states of a rock or in different states of an electron) there may be experience, not 
necessarily experiences had by the rock or electron but somehow associated with it.
9
   
 
 Panpsychism, or a closely related version of consciousness-attribution, is 
taken to be a consequence of the "hard problem,"
10
 which is that there can be no 
intuitively satisfying answer to the question: How are experiencesÑperceptions, 
emotions, feelingsÑmanufactured as the end products of a processes involving at 
their origins or somewhere along the way, neurological events?   
 The hard problem looks insoluble because by "explanation" we typically 
understand the recitation of a causal sequence that can be visualized to fill in the gap 
between two observable events.  But we cannot even imagine a causal sequence 
beginning with a neural event and ending with an experience, even if common sense 
posits a definite cause-effect relation.  We could discover that when, and only when 
their 'C-fibres' fire, subjects report being in pain.  Or that whenever a particular 
neuron in her cortex is stimulated, a subject reports thinking of her grandmother.  But 
no instrument, and certainly not our own eyes, can ever show us the fibres or the 
neuron producing the experience. 
11
  Producing experiences is not like producing 
cornflakes in a cereal factory, starting with raw ingredients.   
 To be sure, new types of entity can emerge from bases that are completely 
unlike them.  Snowflakes, for example, are very surprising products of ordinary water 
vapour subjected to cold.  Life arises from mixtures of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and 
other chemical elements.  Galen Strawson argues that experience cannot be like 
snowflakes or life, an emergent phenomenon wholly dependent on an underlying non-
experiential physical substrate. In his view, "For any feature Y of anything that is 
correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X 
alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y." The way Y 
 4 
emerges must, he says, be intelligible rather than brute and so miraculous. 
12
   
  Strawson probably means by this slightly obscure formulation that we can 
understand how the cold forces the crystallization of molecules of water vapour into 
six-pointed shapes, and how, for example, from the behaviour of individual birds, the 
behaviour of a flock, which moves as a unit emerges.  In these cases, physico-
chemical things emerge from other physico-chemical things.  But we can't in principle 
understand how the physico-chemical cells of our brains could act in concert so as to 
enable a (non physico-chemical) experience to emerge.  Strawson concludes that the 
substrate for human consciousness must consist of conscious microphysical entities 
with their own form of microawareness, so that like arises from like.
13
  Unlike 
Chalmers, however, Strawson rules out consciousness in macroscopic inanimate 
objects of our everyday experience.
14
   
Chalmers maintained that researchers in the neurosciences are trying to solve 
only the "easy problems" of consciousness: "How does the brain process 
environmental stimulation? How does it integrate information? How do we produce 
reports on internal states?"  They cannot answer the question, "Why is all this 
processing accompanied by an experienced inner life?" 
15
 And this explanation gap is 
the driver behind Chalmers's willingness, as well as Strawson's willingness, to extend 
consciousness to inanimate objects of our everyday experience.  
The 'hard problem' is thereby connected to the 'zombie' hypothesis that 
surfaces repeatedly in The Conscious Mind.  The zombie hypothesis is the proposal 
that a person could have a zombie-twin behaviorally indistinguishable from him or 
herself who is able to evince exactly the same competences in learning, reminiscence, 
and linguistic and social interaction, whilst lacking phenomenal consciousness.  The 
thought experiment is supposed to show that having a certain physiological make-up, 
including a physiologically active human-type brain, is not sufficient for 
consciousness.  But if consciousness is something extra that would have to be 'added' 
to a zombie to get a human, why not suppose that it could be 'added' to other entities 
besides zombies?  Thus, the claim that a human brain is not sufficient for human-type 
consciousness gets converted into a claim that a brain of any sort is not even 
necessary for some form of consciousness.     
 To the empiricist, panpsychist conclusions about the possible distribution of 
experience and the reasoning that delivers them will seem strange.  Phenomenal 
consciousness exists on the earth and perhaps on some other planets, or somewhere 
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else in the universe.  But how could what we can report imagining happening in some 
possible world, namely, the existence of a twin zombie, inform us about the possible 
extent of consciousness in this universe, the one that we live in? We can imagine a 
world in which pebbles, or protons, or thermostats are conscious, as we can imagine a 
world in which nonhuman animals converse with one another at length in Flemish.  
But just as we should not infer from our imaginative abilities that maybe some of the 
actual nonhuman animals on Earth converse with one another at some length in 
Flemish, we should not infer that protons and thermostats might be conscious because 
we can imagine a world in which they are.
16
   
 
II.  
Both zombie arguments and the explanatory gap argument invoke the 
Cartesian idea of a simulacrum of an organism, but use it to argue for an un-Cartesian 
conclusion.  This strategy has its perils. 
Before Descartes proposed his beast-machine hypothesis, philosophers 
including Erasmus and Montaigne, as well as nonphilosophers, supposed that animals 
had feelings, contemplated options, made decisions, and experienced the world.
17
  
Descartes claimed to the contrary that animals were nonconscious mechanical 
devices, and he implied that a perfect simulacrum of a human being could be 
constructed that would only give itself away if it were put into a position of having to 
carry on a conversation or perform some intellectually challenging feat.  Awareness, 
linguistic competence, reasoning, volition, and behavioral innovation or flexibility 
were human competencies he could not explain in "mechanical" terms, but since 
nonhuman animals did not appear to him to have these competencies, this was not a 
problem for his theory. He accordingly ascribed consciousness to entities that 
possessed them and declared that these competencies could not be explained 
mechanically but only by the possession of a separate, incorporeal soul. 
18
 
Today, zombie arguments can appeal to technological progress in AI.  
Electronic devices are becoming better and better at simulating linguistically 
competent, reasoning, inventive human beings, who can carry on a sensible 
conversation, write a poem or a musical composition, win a chess game, or drive a 
car. The power of unconscious mechanisms to produce lifelike behavior was explored 
theoretically by Valentino Braitenberg, who presented designs for what he termed 
"vehicles," beginning with a simple toy consisting of sensors wired to wheels that 
 6 
could be made to approach or avoid or hover near a stimulus. 
19
  Braitenberg showed 
how not only context-appropriate actions, but what we think of as internal states such 
as memory and expectation, and even character traits such as optimism and egoism 
could be simulated, if what he called "Ergotrixwire," permitting learning of causal 
relationships and "Mnemotrixwire," for the laying down of memories, could be used 
in the construction of the vehicles.  Although neither type of wire exists, some 
capabilities that were resistant to simulation when Braitenberg published his book in 
1986, namely automated facial recognition, and linguistic dialogue, have substantially 
advanced, as has automated theorem proving in mathematics.  
The original Cartesian argument depended on the principle of parsimony.  If 
animal behavior can be explained without ascribing consciousness, the argument said, 
don't ascribe it, because the notion of the animal mind is a superfluous multiplication 
of entities. The Cartesian argument is: 
 
The technician can roughly explain/give a mechanical model for/simulate animal behavior 
without appealing to consciousness.  
In theory, animal behavior can be perfectly explained/simulated without appealing to 
consciousness. 
So, ascribing consciousness to animals to explain their behavior would be gratuitous, and 
should be avoided.   
 
This argument looks pretty good.  ButÉwe don't argue as follows, even on the basis 
of the astonishing progress of simulating devices which may some day be able to do 
everything that humans do, including using language responsively and creatively, 
which Descartes took to be categorical evidence of a special human mind not 
possessed by other animals.   
 
The technician can roughly explain/give a mechanical model for/simulate my behavior 
without appealing to consciousness. 
In theory, my behavior can be perfectly explained/simulated without appealing to 
consciousness. 
So, ascribing consciousness to me to explain my behavior would be gratuitous, and should 
be avoided.   
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This argument looks pretty good too, except that the conclusion is unacceptable. I 
know that I am conscious, so parsimony gets no traction whatsoever.  But if we refuse 
to be parsimonious in all contexts, consciousness gets detached conceptually from any 
sort of behavioral capability.  Once it is detached, it can get attached to thermostats, 
electrons, and so on albeit in a very un-Cartesian manner.   
     To avoid being forced down this thought pathway, we can argue against 
Descartes's conclusion about nonhuman animals as follows:  
 
Even if I were nonlinguistic, never proved or invented anything, and was only as flexible in 
my behavior as the average cat or dog, and even if neuroscience or AI could explain or 
simulate all my behavior, I would still be conscious.   
Therefore, there is no reason to deny consciousness in the average cat or dog even if we can 
give perfect mechanical explanations or AI simulations of their behavior.   
 
Indeed, denying consciousness to nonhuman animals is not really parsimonious. It 
adds a brand-new category of entities:  animals with consciousness as opposed to 
animals without, whereas before we just had animals --and they were all assumed 
conscious until proven otherwise.  
Further, we can go on to argue against Chalmers as follows: If I were an entity 
that not only was nonlinguistic and never proved or invented anything, but was only 
as flexible in my behavior as the average thermostat, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that I was unconscious.  Denying consciousness to thermostats is as 
reasonable as denying consciousness to corpses.  Their behavior, their range of 
capabilities, are just too different to that observed in known and imputed cases of 
consciousness.  And that is a sensible, though still incomplete, answer to Chalmers's 
question why it seems crazy to ascribe consciousness to a thermostat.   
 
III. 
The observation that we have good reason not to take the possibility of 
consciousness in thermostats seriously nevertheless leaves the "hard problem" 
untouched. In addition to the designated "easy problems"-- information processing, or 
the identification of the neural correlates of experience-- what can the neurosciences 
actually tell us about phenomenality?  In 1989, Stewart Sutherland, in a passage 
quoted by Chalmers in his Introduction, stated that "Nothing worth reading has been 
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written about [consciousness]." 
20
  That may have been true in 1989, but it could 
hardly be said today, and in this section I recapitulate some of the most significant 
finding and speculations about phenomenality stemming from the experimental 
sciences.   
Three areas in particular, not coincidentally those Descartes himself identified 
with the possession of an incorporeal "soul," have been the focus of experiment and 
reflection. They are: the notions of a "self," "qualia" and "volition." 
21
  Light is shed 
on these notions largely through the study of aberrations--mistakes of consciousness -
-in people who are impaired though alive and semi-functional.  They suggest answers 
to the question, "What good is consciousness to animals?Ó  If we can understand why 
consciousness is good for animals, we can infer, with some confidence, that it was 
produced and enhanced by natural selection, and, further, that most entities that were 
not produced by natural selection probably lack consciousness.  We cannot be sure 
that it was so produced.  For example, having weight is good for animals since they 
do not fly off the surface of the earth, but everything that has mass has weight; animal 
weight was not produced by natural selection as understood by biologists. 
Nevertheless, animals of a given species have evolved to have a particular range of 
body weights--not too large, not too small--that is fitted to their way of life, and we 
can well ask how an elephant or a mouse uses its size to advantage.       
We speak quite naturally of animals as doing things for or by or to themselves.  
They seek food for themselves, groom themselves, defend themselves, and mutilate 
themselves in captivity.  A tipped over turtle struggles to turn itself right-side up; flies 
clean their legs, and crustaceans favour their wounded limbs. Animals also have 
extended selves; they relate possessively and in a caretaking way to things that are 
theirs, such as territories, mates, nests, and offspring.  
All this implies a need to know where different parts of the body are, what 
they are doing, what hurts or feels nice, with respect especially to the significance of 
the information for survival and reproduction. Knowledge of mine, not mine, and 
someone else's with regard to external things is delivered in the feelings experienced 
in their presence or absence, not simply by perceptual recognition when they are in 
front of us.  The features of organisms that supply what Antonio Damasio calls a 
Òblueprint and anchor for a [conscious] mindÓ 
22
 appear to be: a boundary; an internal 
structure; a dispositional arrangement for the regulation of internal states; a narrow 
range of variability of internal states."  As Richard Dawkins points out, in addition to 
 9 
being "reactive, as a unit to changes within and outside its boundary," which could be 
said of a rosebush, a sentient organism must also possess one nervous system and 
move as a whole. 
23
  From a biological perspective, there is no point to experiencing 
pain and pleasure or having sensory experience if movement is impossible or if the 
animal is at the mercy of the wind or ocean waves and currents. Passive sensory 
consciousness is imaginable in the brain-in-a-vat scenario and actually occurs in 
people with locked in syndrome who can't move, but it can't be found in 
nonpathological nature. Corals, colonial animals fixed to the ocean floor, are unlikely 
to experience pain insofar as they are rooted to the spot and cannot avoid noxious 
stimuli.   
Pathologies of disavowal bring out, by contrast with the normal case, what it is 
like to be a self, and why better, as opposed to worse awareness of one's own body 
and its relationships to other things can be critical for survival.  A stroke patient may 
ignore everything on the left side of her body, with obvious potentially harmful or 
even fatal consequences: ignoring food on one side of her plate, or failing to notice 
approaching automobiles.  Other brain damaged patients become convinced that their 
own arm or leg belongs to someone else and try to throw it out of the hospital bed or 
demand its amputation. Patients who believe themselves to be deadÑCotard's 
syndromeÑdo not relate to their bodies in the same fond and caring way as those who 
feel themselves to be alive.   
Noting that children born without limbs seem to be prewired for experience of 
the missing limb, and that feelings of ownership and the illusion of control as well as 
pain persist in the phantom limbs of amputees, Ronald Melzack
24
 asserts that the 
brain of a human being (and by implication that of many other animals) already 
represents a body typical of the species at birth.  
Yet this bodily sense is also plastic: The sense of "my arm" fills a prosthesis 
once fitted.  Ramachandran showed how to generate the illusion that one's own nose 
is located a few feet away, and by generating the illusion with mirrors that a patient 
could move his paralyzed arm with a painfully clenched fist, he was able permanently 
to relieve the discomfort. 
25
 
Other delusions of ownership and disavowal pertain to the "extended self." 
Feelings of "me" and "mine" are normally produced and maintained within a certain 
band that is neither too narrow and exclusionary nor too wide.  People whose 
awareness of their own body is distorted and or who do not experience a sense of 
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ownership can die of anorexia, or set themselves on fire. In Capgras syndrome, close 
relatives are considered to be imposters because the feeling of their being "mine" is 
not aroused by their presence.  Some demented elderly fail to recognize their spouses 
of many years, or, correspondingly, believe that unrelated strangers are people they 
know well.  Schizophrenia involves intrusive thoughts that are experienced as control 
by minds or voices that belong to someone elseÑoften God or the Devil.  
Ownership of actions is also subject to distortion and manipulation. I can be 
made to feel that I am doing something I am notÑmoving another person's arm or 
controlling prices displayed on a computer by pressing buttons-- or that I am not 
doing something that I am. In table turning, participants in a sance are unaware that 
they are exerting force, and they ascribe the movement of the table to unseen spirits 
26
 
Note that the "sense of self" that is demonstrated indirectly by pathology and 
manipulation is not, as in classical metaphysics, either a pure intuition of "self to itself 
now" as Locke described it,
27
 or referent of the Cartesian thought "I exist," or a 
function of autobiographical memory. Damasio describes the sense of self as "a 
second order mapping of the organism in the act of knowing, which is a feeling.Ó 
28
  
The feeling is not, however, a feeling of existence and continuity. Rather, 
consciousness is a feeling of knowing what is happening.  "A conscious organism 
knows that it is relating to some object, and that the object to which it is relating is 
causing a change in it. "
29
 We Òconstruct and internally exhibit a specific kind of 
wordless knowledgeÑthat our organism has been changed by an object.Ó
30
 A 
complex representation of the body thereby becomes itself an object of representation 
in its relations to an outside (spatially separated) or a temporally separated reality.   
When consciousness is intact, I can distinguish my body from other bodies, 
my home and my offspring from other people's, and my actions from things just 
happening to me.  The "sense of self" implies a corresponding sense of "not-self," and 
so the existence for me of an external world. 
31
 The external world of the dog with its 
sensitivity to odors, of the bird of prey with visual acuity and sensitivity to movement, 
are qualitatively different from ours, as are the worlds of the mole or worm living in 
the dark.  The qualitative or phenomenological worlds of musicians and perfumers, 
whose sensory systems may have started off with advantages and which have been 
developed by long training are different from mine. 
32
  Since our visual system are 
each a little different, we can assume that we all see colors somewhat differently. 
Nevertheless, experience presents, irresistibly to us (what we call) "the world" outside 
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our bodies, and a body that is our own, but whose parts that we can do things to (lift, 
cut, see) as we do things to other external objects.  How widely distributed in living 
nature might this capacity be?    
Here Chalmers Ðand Spinoza--can be supported against Descartes. Take the 
earthwormÑa bounded semipermeable soft bodied thing that is trying to survive long 
enough to produce more little worms.  Its bodily state must be regulated so that it is 
not too hot, too cold, too dry, or too moist; it must try to avoid drowning, freezing and 
baking. While it cannot regulate its body temperature, it maintains internal 
homeostasis and tries to stay alive, though thanks to the existence of concrete 
pavements our modern worms are often unsuccessful in deploying their age-old 
repertoires. It has a central nervous system, with sensory cells, including some along 
its muscles that are probably responsible for proprioception.
33
  
Are earthworms aware of their surroundings?  They do not possess a cerebral 
cortex, the part of the human brain involved in memory, learning, thought, language, 
and consciousness.  However, other animals may use other anatomical devices to 
manufacture worlds.  A recent article in Cell discusses the marine worm Platynereis 
dumerilii. 
34
  This worm, according to its investigators, "lives in self-made tubes, 
explores its environment actively for food, and shows signs of learning behavior." 
When it evolved, the authors explain in interview, "the seafloor would have contained 
various food sources. "In order for organisms to explore these foods, it would have 
been "advantageous to evolve a brain center that was able to integrate the different 
smells and ultimately learn what is good and what is bad food."  
The Òmushroom bodiesÓ in invertebrates such as insects, spiders, crustaceans 
and velvet worms, according to the authors, Òserve as a center for associative learning 
and memory formation, activities that are very similar to those of the cerebral cortex.Ó 
They have been shown to be responsible for associative learning, and their discoverer 
Flix Dujardin proposed in 1850 that they gave these tiny creatures free will, an 
ability to act against instinct. 
35
 As Griffin argues, "[T]he capability of conscious 
awareness under some conditions may well be so essential that it is the sine qua none 
of animal life, even for the smallest and simplest animals that have any central 
nervous system at all. When the whole system is small, this core function may 
therefore be a larger fraction of the whole." 
36
 Chittka remarks of the bee which co-
operates to build an elaborate geometrical structure, the hive, evaluates food sources, 
maps its territory, remembers threats, communicates information to its fellows, 
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provisions its young, enters into seemingly emotional states, and can solve novel 
problems under laboratory conditions, that references to 'instinct' fail to do justice to 
the behavioural complexity of social insects. 
37
 
 But why have qualia? Gerald Edelman and colleagues argue that the organism 
needs to be faced with a scene in order to extract and employ information.  "Even 
implicit learning initially requires consciousness of stimuli from which regularities 
are unconsciously developed."
38
   
 It is helpful to remember in this connection that the human brain is a system of 
160 billion neurons and supporting cells in interaction, interacting at tremendous 
speeds, far faster than today's supercomputers. There is nothing stable in these 
fleeting, flicking configurations, regardless of whether we are asleep or awake: even 
under anaesthesia, our brains are running.  Yet we see a world of objects, many of 
which are fixed in place, have determinate properties, and can move at trackable 
speeds. Ramachandran and Hirstein argue that qualia are stable and "irrevocable"
39
.  
The visual scene is a decision about how reality is that is a selection out of multiple 
possibilities.    What makes decisions about what's in the world necessary is that the 
physical stimuli, light waves, for example, that reach our eyes (elements of our 
common, nominal world) are consistent with a number of different scenes.  Even for 
the individual animal, there is no unique mapping from these physical signals to 
experience. As they elaborate the point, "To deliberately overstate the case it's as 
though when you look at even the simplest visual scene, you generate an endless 
number of hallucinations and pick the one hallucination that most accurately matches 
the current input."
40
  When possibilities are equiprobable, and even when they are not, 
consciousness may select the most optimistic or pessimistic one, or select in accord 
with some other heuristic such as recency. 
 The world-making mechanisms of the brain and body, then, serve to present a 
scene, inviting action or permitting inaction.  The nervous system conjures up a 
preferred presentation, visually, acoustically, in terms of taste, smell, or touch, or in 
terms of the other senses we lack, thereby deciding what entities there are in the 
environment, how far away they are, what is occluding what, how dangerous or 
salutary they are.  Consciousness presents to the animal a world in which it can 
exercise, and fail to exercise, or exercise maladroitly or successfully, control, in 
situations calling for decisions, elegantly described by the Dawkins as events which 
lead to "a sudden decrease in the uncertainty of future behavior."
41
  A decision might 
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indeed be regarded as the psychological analogue of homeostasis, according to which 
the organism seeks to keep its future experience within a narrow range of envisioned 
bounds.  To do so, it may compare "pictorially" the present with the past and with an 
imagined future.  
 Information about what, where, how fast, how strong, how sturdy, mine or not 
mine, as well as the qualities of the whatsÑhow ripe, how edible, how friendly, how 
needyÑis delivered, not on a narrowly "need to know basis," but on a far broader 
one, perhaps making consciousness seem like an overly generous endowment.  That 
is, I don't need right now to see that the tree outside my window has thousands of 
individual leaves, but either I do sometimes need that level of perceptual detail or my 
ancestors did and I have retained an unused capacity.  
Pathologies involving qualia include not only blindness, deafness, lacking a 
sense of smell or taste, for which the disadvantages are obvious, but other partial 
defects.  Stroke patients suffering from "blindsight," studied by Larry Weiskrantz,
42
 
though they can perform a range of tasks including navigation, (some can even drive a 
car), and though they can register the emotional significance of faces and depicted 
scenes, cannot do other things usually necessary for survival and reproduction, such 
as determining the age or gender of those faces. Faced with either a horizontal 
mailbox or a vertical mailbox the blindsighted person can put the letter in, but faced 
with a horizontal mailbox and a vertical mailbox they don't know what to do. These 
findings reinforce the view that consciousness is sometimes needed to make 
decisions. Its invention in evolutionary history would seem to parallel the invention of 
freedom in the sense of having, in your species-repertoire, different possible 
responses to sensed external and internal conditions.  Consciousness is arguably a 
condition of behavioral flexibility, another early insight of Descartes.  
  At this point a pertinent objection arises to the claim that consciousness is 
necessary for at least some forms of life.  Couldn't a well-programmed machine 
succeed in the mailbox task, the recognition of male and female faces, and so on?  We 
know that activities such as orienting, crouching, flinching, pouncing, are efficiently 
automated.
 43
  A frog will snap at anything of a given size, shape and distance; the 
costs of wasting energy or capturing unwanted prey are outweighed by nutritional 
benefits.  Some simple heuristic similar to that governing the frog's responses may 
even determine whether a lioness attacks a gazelle or conserves her strength for a 
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better opportunity.  We find ourselves getting out of bed or out of the bath without 
having made a conscious decision that now is the time.  
  Since the original research on blindsight, revealing not only what patients 
cannot do, but what they can do, it has become apparent how much of human life is 
accomplished on a subconscious level.  Motor activities such as riding a bicycle and 
driving become automated or semi-automated. Tasks like hammering can be carried 
out without the subject's attention to what they are doing.  We often write and speak 
"spontaneously" without having consciously decided what to say or write. The hand is 
removed from the flame before the sensation of pain is felt.  
A person who is dysmorphic, blindsighted, who suffers from a neglect or 
disavowal syndrome, or a mixed-up sense of voluntary control, is clearly at a survival 
and reproduction disadvantage, though the deficiencies may be compensated for or 
made irrelevant in the context. We can indeed believe that a heritable tendency to 
these conditions would not be preserved and that the underpinnings for not having 
them Ðfor having a normal self--are heritable.  But the problems of these people, it 
might be argued, arise from defects in their nonconscious processing.  Impaired 
consciousness, it might be argued, always indicates impaired information processing 
on a nonconscious level.  Therefore, we gain no insight, according to this objection, 
into the advantages of consciousness from considering defects in conscious 
experience.  
Indeed, contrary to what Ramachandran suggests, the automatic machinery 
might decide both what reality is and what to do about it.  Perhaps some form of 
information processing decides that there is a tree in front of me, and I get a useless 
epiphenomenal presentation delivered to me in the form of the experience of seeing a 
tree.  Some form of information processing completely unavailable to consciousness 
decides that I am going to climb it, and I get a feeling of volition that bears no causal 
relationship whatsoever to my subsequent climb.   
 My feeling that I decided to climb the tree and am doing it out of my own free 
will is Ðaccording to much recent experimental evidenceÑjust the information 
delivered to me that I am going to do, or doing this thing that my nervous system after 
summing and ranking and otherwise manipulating a slew of inputs is now set to do, 
with a feeling of ownership or "authorship" attached.  Seeing that there is milk in the 
refrigerator together with my desire for milky coffee gives me a reason toÑ
voluntarilyÑreach for it and pour it into my coffee. But all I can state with 
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confidence is that I saw the milk, that I recognized it as something I needed or 
wanted, that I reached for it, and that the action as it was happening and in retrospect 
felt like something I did because I wanted to do it and no one else was making me do 
it.    
On this view, the feeling that we are making a decision or performing a 
voluntary action is the perception of a thought as the cause of an action, but in fact the 
action or decision is initiated Ðvia what D.M. Wegner calls "unconscious and 
inscrutable mechanisms,"
44
 before we are aware of the decision or volition. Once the 
unconscious processing mechanism has brought about an action, volitional feelings 
and later reasons appear in our minds for why we decided to do that.  We come to 
believe that these reasons caused our choice.  The will, says Wegner, is an illusion 
because consciousness has no input into actions. Wegner thinks that we need the 
illusion of free will because it is important for blame and the sanctions that maintain 
responsibility in social life.
45
   
Only the neural correlates of conscious experience, it seems, can fully fill in 
the causal chain. We seem to be pushed and pulled by hunger, thirst, lust, aggression, 
and so on, but the seeings and realizings of phenomenal consciousness cannot initiate 
physical movements of our limbs, changing the quantity and direction of movement in 
the universe.  One might object that if ordinary examples of deliberate activity do not 
establish that consciousness has causal powers, other examples do, including the 
voluntary control over some autonomic processes that Yogis can achieve, or the 
control over the firing of single neurons, that can be achieved with practice and 
biofeedback. 
46
 And don't mental states of preparedness make a difference to how we 
react, physically, to loud noises or bad news, or temptation?  None of these 
phenomena, however, can reveal consciousness as causally active; they are consistent 
with epiphenomenalism.    
Against this line of argument, one might ask why, if conscious awareness 
makes no difference to survival and reproduction, the nervous system goes to so much 
trouble to differentiate between things I did and things that happened to my body, 
inducing in me the "illusion" that I control my actions?  Why couldn't everything be 
presented to me as a happening to my body?  But it is vitally important for a squirrel 
or a mouse to know that it initiated some action, not for moral or social reasons, but 
because information about what outcomes it can control and what happenings it can't 
is important for survival. 
47
 And if our decisions and behavior were governed by 
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unconscious mechanisms, and if consciousness contributed nothing to our 
functioning, then, as Brian Earl argues, we could go through life dreaming or 
hallucinating and it would make absolutely no difference.  If qualia were useless, he 
points out, it would seem unnecessary for the nervous system take such care in 
composing and adjusting Ðvia mechanisms for color and shape constancy for 
example--the qualitative details in the "scene."  
Further, the following activities, cited by Earl,
 
 are difficult to automate: 
"Interacting with conspecifics; attending to a sudden or unexpected event; paying 
close attention to a task; being alert in unusual, interesting, or unpredictable 
situations; observing events as they occur; imitating an action that is contrary to 
habit;" or learning a new skill.  Even more difficult to automate are such activities as 
"mentally processing instructions, thinking through an expected event, or preparing 
actions by mental rehearsal, and remembering and reviewing events."
48
 Yet these 
activities can be essential for survival in a range of birds and mammals, as well as in 
humans, whether or not they are needed in the other taxa.  
 
 
IV. 
The hypothesis I propose is that consciousness evolved in animals because certain 
activities that give them a survival and reproduction advantage are difficult to 
automate. To be sure, we can imagine these activities being fully automated in a 
possible world (the zombie scenario), and it is even possible that they could be 
automated in our world (the AI scenario). A very large robot, with super small chips 
or working on quantum principles might be able to do exactly what animals do.  The 
robot would not only convert energy from the environment into purposeful activity; it 
would be able to make good, but slightly imperfect copies of itself, exhibiting enough 
variation for natural selection to work on in a demanding and changing environment.    
The hypothesis is simply that consciousness can produce the competencies in question 
more efficiently than an unconscious mechanism could.  The unconscious device 
would require too much energy of a type difficult to obtainable in oceans, forests, and 
plains; would need too much complicated, buggy software, and too much massive, 
prone to breakdown hardware to carry out the activities of life.     
The existence of consciousness in our world is, then, explained by the fact that 
it is useful to the animals that have it, just as their hearts, wings, habits of burrowing, 
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or habits of reciprocal altruism are useful to the animals that have them.  We should 
be astonished if consciousness arose in non-animal entities that cannot use it because 
there would be no explanation at all for its presence.  
It might be objected that nothing said so far favors the conclusion that 
consciousness was selected for, rather than some underlying machinery that --
however complex or even mystifying in the eyes of human engineers--serves as its 
substrate and so is responsible for all animal competencies.  If it is only certain forms 
of neural anatomy and physiology that were selected for, then, it seems, we cannot 
characterize consciousness as such as useful, and the argument that we should be 
astonished if consciousness were uselessly present in non-living entities is 
unavailable.  We have no way to determine whether:  
 
a) Natural selection favored phenomenal consciousness, because organisms with 
small degrees of phenomenal consciousness and a subjective sense of agency were 
originally favored over their less conscious competitors, and organisms with more 
consciousness were favored up to a point over competitors with less.  
 
Or: 
 
b)  Natural selection favored certain competencies and gradually developed the 
machinery to support them in various forms and degrees by favoring variants that 
possessed them.  These competencies happen to be correlated with phenomenal 
consciousness and feelings of agency, but these were not as such targets of 
selection.  
 
But the impression of "choice" between a) and b) is misleading.  Nature does not 
"favor" either consciousness or machinery.  Nature simply drives down the frequency 
of genes belonging to individuals who encounter unfavorable life conditions and who 
die without outbreeding their conspecifics. The result has been that animals with 
particular neurological substrata making experience possible appeared on the planet, 
including perhaps worms and insects, but most certainly birds and mammals.  We can 
infer from the ecological niche they occupy that worms don't feel love or have visual 
dreams with wild plots, but the niches occupied by birds and mammals readily allow 
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for this. The evolving neural morphology and evolving competencies of the included 
taxa can nevertheless as far as we know be traced back to the same common ancestor.      
 To conclude, from an ethological standpoint, it makes no sense to ask: Why 
would my zombie-twin benefit from being conscious?  That is like asking, why would 
this pigeon, if it didn't have wings but could do everything a pigeon with wings can 
do, benefit from having wings? Or why would this worm, if it could do everything a 
tunneling worm could do but without tunneling, benefit from being endowed with a 
tunneling habit?  The question is not how pigeons without wings came to have wings, 
or how birds, insects, and mammals that needn't have been conscious became 
conscious. The question is how we got pigeons, tunnelling worms, and conscious 
animals. The answer is that the evolution of consciousness, like the evolution of 
wings and hearts, created new niches in ecological space for new types of living 
individual. Wings permitted the organisms that evolved them to take to the air to find 
new sources of food such as pollens and insects and to evade ground dwelling 
predators.  Hearts permitted the organisms that evolved them to distribute oxygen and 
nutrients and collect waste products; they were preconditions of the development of 
brains. In inventing the underlying mechanisms that are necessary and sufficient for 
awareness of an external world, for awareness of a self distinct from other objects of 
interest, and for awareness of this self's agency in that world, nature made the forms 
of life of humans and many other animals possible.    
 The thermostat doesn't have any of the internal mechanisms Ða cerebral 
cortex or mushroom bodies -- found in entities known or reasonably believed to be 
consciousness. Nor is it partaking in the struggle for existence or competition to pass 
on its genes to the next generation.  It isn't a member of a lineage that developed 
consciousness as a valuable trait. Above all, it doesn't move or make decisions and 
doesn't need to have a world presented to it.  Accordingly, the answer to the question 
why it is crazy to suppose the thermostat could be conscious is that it is stuck to the 
wall.   
 There is one final important objection to the claim that by taking 
consciousness as an evolutionary invention, we can decisively rule out its possession 
by non-living things.  The objection is that evolutionary inventions can pre-exist or be 
reproduced in non-evolutionary contexts and formats. For example, luminescence is 
an evolutionary discovery of fireflies and some marine animals, but light is also 
produced naturally in the non-living stars and can be produced artificially by humans 
 19 
in lightbulbs.  Analogously, evolution may simply have chanced to hit on a 
phenomenon--consciousness-- pre-existing in non-living nature and technologically 
reproducible.  Like light production, consciousness production may have been 
'discovered' for the use of animals when the demands on them for behavioural 
responsiveness reached a certain level of complexity. without being restricted to them.  
So the question whether consciousness is a naturally occurring phenomenon that can 
appear in a range of systems is a real one.   
 As suggested above, there is no reason to rule out the possibility of synthetic 
conscious life in the form of devices utilising new miniaturising technologies that 
essentially copy the features of animal systems that are necessary and sufficient for 
consciousness, including sensory organs and a unified nervous system. That said, we 
have good reason to doubt that a device consisting, for example, of the population of 
China equipped with two way-radios and satellite connectivity could have 
experiences of a changing visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. scene with the twin 
hallmarks of differentiation and integration.
49
  We have even better reason to doubt 
that chairs and electrons, which have no sense organs and cannot move in purposeful 
ways, could be conscious of a world of things separate from themselves. Panpsychists 
frequently refer in this connection to "very simple" forms of consciousness, but that 
term is a mere placeholder for an I-know-not-what. They are not entitled to indicate 
by the term "very simple" the kind of consciousness we might imagine a worm or a 
wasp possesses.  
 Accordingly, in order to have good grounds for rejecting panpsychism, it is 
not necessary to solve the hard problem.  We need only agree that it does not follow 
from our inability to solve that problem that consciousness could be found anywhere 
or everywhere. We do not need to know exactly how unconscious physical entities, in 
the right number and arrangement, doing what they normally do, produce 
consciousness in order to consider its possession by electrons or thermostats as a 
hypothesis not worth advancing, let alone pursuing.  If you accept it that 
consciousness implies the existence of experiences--which, after all, was the launch 
pad for the "hard problem" -- and if you accept it that experiences are unlikely to exist 
where there are neither decisions relevant to survival and reproduction to be made, 
nor were, formerly, such decisions to be made (as in the case of locked-in 
syndromes), nor deliberately manufactured simulations of experiencing and deciding, 
you will have a good defence against an ambitious but undertheorized panpsychism. 
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Further, as I hope to have shown here, progress on the so-called 'easy problems' of 
consciousness (which no researcher into animal consciousness would describe in that 
way) can begin shed light on the many dimensions of conscious awareness in 
perception, volition, and cognition.       
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